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Compatibility report v0.0.1-alpha.44

Not tested

No test exists for this operation. The generator declined to write one, and says why.

Not tested 169 operations in 9 services Narrow this down

Batch

  • CancelJob never-probe Cancels a job that has not started running. Against a real account the identifier could name a caller's own queued work, and a cancelled Batch job cannot be resumed — it has to be submitted again.
  • CancelJobs never-probe CancelJobs is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • CreateQuotaShare never-probe CreateQuotaShare is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • CreateServiceEnvironment never-probe CreateServiceEnvironment is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • DeleteQuotaShare never-probe DeleteQuotaShare is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • DeleteServiceEnvironment never-probe DeleteServiceEnvironment is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • SubmitJob never-probe Submits real, billable work to a job queue: AWS provisions compute for it and charges for what it consumes. Nothing in a scenario undoes a submission, and a probe group has no teardown.
  • SubmitServiceJob never-probe Submits a SageMaker training service job — the same billable-work objection as SubmitJob, against a service whose training runs are the expensive kind.
  • TerminateJob never-probe Terminates a running job, killing its container mid-execution. On a real account that is someone's in-flight work, and the job cannot be resumed.
  • TerminateJobs never-probe TerminateJobs is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • TerminateServiceJob never-probe Terminates a running SageMaker training service job, discarding whatever the training run had done so far.
  • TerminateServiceJobs never-probe TerminateServiceJobs is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateQuotaShare never-probe UpdateQuotaShare is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateServiceEnvironment never-probe UpdateServiceEnvironment is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateServiceJob never-probe Re-prioritises a service job that is already queued or running, which changes the order real work is scheduled in.

Cloud Map

  • CreatePrivateDnsNamespace never-probe Creates a namespace and, with it, a Route 53 private hosted zone attached to a VPC in the caller's account. The hosted zone is billed and outlives the run.
  • CreatePublicDnsNamespace never-probe Creates a namespace and a Route 53 **public** hosted zone, which is billed monthly and answers queries from the internet until somebody deletes it.
  • DiscoverInstancesRevision never-probe Not refused for danger — it reads and changes nothing — but for what it could assert. Its whole response is one revision counter, and a counter read for a namespace that does not exist says nothing true about the service. It is covered instead by DiscoverInstances on the service the run owns.
  • UpdateInstanceCustomHealthStatus never-probe Marks a live instance healthy or unhealthy, which is what decides whether clients are given it at all.
  • UpdatePrivateDnsNamespace never-probe Rewrites the SOA record of the private hosted zone behind a live namespace, changing how long every negative answer under it is cached.
  • UpdatePublicDnsNamespace never-probe The same rewrite against a public hosted zone, where the cached answers are the internet's.

ELBv2

  • ApplySecurityGroupsToLoadBalancer never-probe Replaces the security groups of a load balancer wholesale rather than adding to them, so a probe would strip whatever rules the caller's own load balancer relies on.
  • AttachLoadBalancerToSubnets never-probe Puts a live load balancer into another subnet, which changes where it accepts traffic.
  • DeregisterInstancesFromLoadBalancer never-probe Takes instances out of service behind a live load balancer.
  • DetachLoadBalancerFromSubnets never-probe Removes a load balancer from a subnet, and with it every instance in that subnet.
  • DisableAvailabilityZonesForLoadBalancer never-probe Takes a whole Availability Zone out of a load balancer. AWS documents the instances in it as deregistered and the zone's capacity as lost immediately.
  • EnableAvailabilityZonesForLoadBalancer never-probe Adds an Availability Zone to a live load balancer, changing where it serves from and what it bills for.
  • RegisterInstancesWithLoadBalancer never-probe Puts EC2 instances into service behind a live load balancer, sending it traffic it was not meant to receive.
  • SetLoadBalancerListenerSSLCertificate never-probe Replaces the TLS certificate a live listener serves.
  • SetLoadBalancerPoliciesForBackendServer never-probe Replaces the policies applied to a backend port wholesale — an empty list removes every one of them.
  • SetLoadBalancerPoliciesOfListener never-probe Replaces the policies applied to a listener wholesale, which is how a listener loses its stickiness or its cipher policy.

IAM

  • AcceptDelegationRequest never-probe AcceptDelegationRequest is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • AcquireRole never-probe AcquireRole is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • AddClientIDToOpenIDConnectProvider never-probe AddClientIDToOpenIDConnectProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • AssociateDelegationRequest never-probe AssociateDelegationRequest is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • ChangePassword never-probe Changes the console password of the IAM user whose credentials signed the request, which locks that user out of the console until somebody with the new password says otherwise.
  • CreateAccountAlias never-probe Sets the account-wide sign-in alias. There is one per account, so the call silently replaces whatever the account already had, and every bookmarked sign-in URL for the old alias stops working.
  • CreateDelegationRequest never-probe CreateDelegationRequest is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • CreateLoginProfile never-probe Gives an IAM user a console password. It turns a programmatic-only identity into one that can sign in to the console, which is a change to the account's attack surface rather than to a test fixture.
  • CreateOpenIDConnectProvider never-probe CreateOpenIDConnectProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • CreateSAMLProvider never-probe Registers a SAML identity provider for the account. Everything the provider's assertions are trusted for follows from it, and nothing in a probe group removes it.
  • CreateServiceLinkedRole probe-of-implemented-op CreateServiceLinkedRole is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • CreateServiceSpecificCredential never-probe CreateServiceSpecificCredential is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • CreateVirtualMFADevice never-probe Allocates a virtual MFA device with its own seed. AWS counts it against the account's device quota whether or not anybody ever enables it, and only DeleteVirtualMFADevice reclaims it.
  • DeactivateMFADevice never-probe Removes the MFA device from a user, so an identity that was protected by a second factor no longer is.
  • DeleteAccountAlias never-probe Removes the account's sign-in alias, breaking every sign-in URL built on it.
  • DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy never-probe Deletes the account-wide password policy, so every complexity, rotation and reuse rule the account relied on is gone at once and AWS keeps no copy to restore.
  • DeleteLoginProfile never-probe Removes an IAM user's console password, locking that user out of the console immediately.
  • DeleteOpenIDConnectProvider never-probe DeleteOpenIDConnectProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • DeleteSAMLProvider never-probe DeleteSAMLProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • DeleteSSHPublicKey never-probe DeleteSSHPublicKey is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • DeleteServerCertificate never-probe DeleteServerCertificate is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • DeleteServiceLinkedRole never-probe Starts the deletion of a service-linked role. The role is what an AWS service uses to act in the account, so deleting it stops that service working, and the deletion is asynchronous — the call returns a task id and cannot be taken back.
  • DeleteServiceSpecificCredential never-probe DeleteServiceSpecificCredential is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • DeleteSigningCertificate never-probe Deletes an X.509 signing certificate from a user. Anything signing requests with that certificate stops being able to authenticate.
  • DeleteVirtualMFADevice never-probe Deletes a virtual MFA device. AWS keeps no copy of its seed, so the device cannot be recreated and whoever enrolled it has to enrol again.
  • DisableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement never-probe Turns off centralised root-credentials management for the organization, returning root credentials to each member account. It is an organization-wide security posture change made from one API call.
  • DisableOrganizationsRootSessions never-probe Turns off privileged root sessions for the organization's member accounts, changing what the management account can do in every one of them.
  • DisableOutboundWebIdentityFederation never-probe Turns off the account's outbound web identity federation, so every external workload that was exchanging this account's identity for a token stops being able to.
  • EnableMFADevice never-probe Associates an MFA device with a user and requires two consecutive authentication codes to do it. A probe would either enrol a device nobody asked to enrol or spend the user's authentication attempts guessing codes.
  • EnableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement never-probe Turns on centralised root-credentials management across the organization, which takes root credentials away from every member account.
  • EnableOrganizationsRootSessions never-probe Turns on privileged root sessions across the organization's member accounts.
  • EnableOutboundWebIdentityFederation never-probe Turns on outbound web identity federation for the account, which starts vending tokens that name this account to external workloads.
  • GenerateCredentialReport never-probe Starts the account-wide credential report job. It is billed, it is rate limited to one report every four hours, and it collects every credential's age and last-used data into a report a probe has no reason to want.
  • GenerateOrganizationsAccessReport never-probe GenerateOrganizationsAccessReport is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • GenerateServiceLastAccessedDetails never-probe GenerateServiceLastAccessedDetails is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • GetAccountProperties never-probe A read, and the one entry here that is not about danger. AWS added GetAccountProperties to the model after every SDK the typed suites pin: aws-sdk-go-v2/service/iam v1.53.7 declares no GetAccountPropertiesInput, so probing it scopes this whole probe group away from go-sdk with go-emit-unsupported, and the java, dotnet and rust emitters — which read the model rather than their SDK — would emit a call those builds cannot compile. It takes no required member, so withholding a curated literal, which is what leaves GetRoleTemplateVersion refused, cannot reach it and this map is the only lever. Delete the entry once the pins carry the operation.
  • GetRoleTemplateVersion unbound-required-member GetRoleTemplateVersion.TemplateArn (arnType, a string) has no bind, no matching export, no curated value and no derivable literal
  • PutAccountProperties never-probe Writes account-level IAM properties. There is one set per account, so a probe would overwrite the caller's own settings with no way to know what they were.
  • RejectDelegationRequest never-probe RejectDelegationRequest is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • RemoveClientIDFromOpenIDConnectProvider never-probe RemoveClientIDFromOpenIDConnectProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • ResetServiceSpecificCredential never-probe ResetServiceSpecificCredential is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • ResyncMFADevice never-probe Resynchronises a user's MFA device with two authentication codes, which consumes the user's codes and, on repeated failure, is what an attacker guessing them looks like.
  • SendDelegationToken never-probe SendDelegationToken is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • SetDefaultPolicyVersion never-probe Changes which version of a managed policy is the operative one. Every principal the policy is attached to gets a different effective permission set the moment the call lands.
  • SetSecurityTokenServicePreferences never-probe Sets the account-wide STS global endpoint token version, which decides whether tokens the account mints are usable in Regions enabled after the call.
  • TagMFADevice never-probe TagMFADevice is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • TagOpenIDConnectProvider never-probe TagOpenIDConnectProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • TagSAMLProvider never-probe TagSAMLProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • TagServerCertificate never-probe TagServerCertificate is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UntagMFADevice never-probe UntagMFADevice is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UntagOpenIDConnectProvider never-probe UntagOpenIDConnectProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UntagSAMLProvider never-probe UntagSAMLProvider is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UntagServerCertificate never-probe UntagServerCertificate is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateAccessKey never-probe Activates or deactivates an access key. Deactivating one an application is signing with breaks that application immediately, and a probe cannot know which keys are in use.
  • UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy never-probe Replaces the account-wide password policy wholesale. Unset members are reset to AWS's defaults rather than left alone, so a partial call silently relaxes rules the account depended on.
  • UpdateDelegationRequest never-probe UpdateDelegationRequest is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateGroup never-probe UpdateGroup is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateLoginProfile never-probe Sets a new console password for an IAM user, locking out whoever held the old one.
  • UpdateOpenIDConnectProviderThumbprint never-probe UpdateOpenIDConnectProviderThumbprint is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateRoleDescription never-probe UpdateRoleDescription is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateSAMLProvider never-probe Replaces the metadata document of a live SAML provider, which changes which assertions the account trusts.
  • UpdateSSHPublicKey never-probe UpdateSSHPublicKey is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateServerCertificate never-probe UpdateServerCertificate is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateServiceSpecificCredential never-probe UpdateServiceSpecificCredential is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UpdateSigningCertificate never-probe UpdateSigningCertificate is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UploadSSHPublicKey never-probe UploadSSHPublicKey is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • UploadServerCertificate never-probe Uploads a server certificate and its private key into the account's IAM certificate store. A probe has no key to upload that is not either a real one or a fake the account then holds forever.
  • UploadSigningCertificate never-probe Uploads an X.509 signing certificate for a user, adding a new way to authenticate as that identity.

KMS

  • ConnectCustomKeyStore never-probe Connects a custom key store to its AWS CloudHSM cluster or external key store proxy, which changes whether every KMS key in that store can be used at all.
  • CreateCustomKeyStore never-probe Creates a custom key store bound to a CloudHSM cluster or an external key manager. Nothing in a probe group removes it, and an orphaned key store keeps its backing cluster associated.
  • Decrypt probe-of-implemented-op Decrypt is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • DeleteCustomKeyStore never-probe Deletes a custom key store. AWS refuses only while the store still holds KMS keys, so a store emptied by an earlier deletion is destroyed by this call.
  • DeleteImportedKeyMaterial never-probe Deletes the imported key material of a KMS key. Every ciphertext encrypted under that key becomes undecryptable until the same material is imported again, and AWS keeps no copy of it.
  • DeriveSharedSecret never-probe Performs an ECDH key agreement with the caller's public key and bills for it. It also takes a raw public key blob, which the IR cannot express.
  • DisableKeyRotation never-probe Turns off automatic annual rotation for a live KMS key, which is a control an account's compliance posture is usually built on.
  • DisconnectCustomKeyStore never-probe Disconnects a custom key store from its backing cluster. Every KMS key in the store stops working for cryptographic operations until it is reconnected.
  • EnableKeyRotation never-probe Turns on automatic annual rotation for a live KMS key. AWS bills for each key version the rotation creates, and rotation cannot be undone for versions already generated.
  • Encrypt probe-of-implemented-op Encrypt is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • GenerateDataKeyPairWithoutPlaintext never-probe GenerateDataKeyPairWithoutPlaintext is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • GenerateMac never-probe GenerateMac is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • GetKeyLastUsage probe-binds-live-resource GetKeyLastUsage.KeyId would bind to key.id, a value exported from a resource the run owns; a probe calls an operation the emulator does not implement, so against real AWS it would act on that resource for real. Add a curated literal for KeyId to values.json, or leave the operation refused
  • ImportKeyMaterial never-probe Replaces the key material of a KMS key with material the caller supplies, which changes what every existing ciphertext under that key decrypts with.
  • ReEncrypt probe-of-implemented-op ReEncrypt is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • ReplicateKey never-probe Creates a replica of a multi-Region key in another Region. The replica is a KMS key of its own, in a Region nothing in this run looks at, and it can only be removed by scheduling its deletion there.
  • RotateKeyOnDemand never-probe Creates a new key version of a live KMS key immediately. AWS bills for each version and a version cannot be removed.
  • Sign probe-of-implemented-op Sign is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • UpdateCustomKeyStore never-probe Changes the cluster, credentials or proxy configuration of a live custom key store, which can leave every KMS key in it unusable.
  • UpdatePrimaryRegion never-probe Moves the primary of a multi-Region key to another Region, demoting the current primary to a replica. It changes which Region may replicate and manage the key.
  • Verify probe-of-implemented-op Verify is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • VerifyMac probe-of-implemented-op VerifyMac is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role

Organizations

  • AcceptHandshake never-probe Accepting a handshake is irreversible: it joins an account to an organization, or enables all features, and AWS documents neither as reversible.
  • AttachPolicy never-probe A policy attachment takes effect immediately for every account under the target; an SCP attached to a root can deny actions across the whole organization.
  • CancelHandshake never-probe Cancels an outstanding invitation permanently: AWS moves the handshake to CANCELED, and it cannot be reinstated.
  • CloseAccount never-probe Closes a member account. AWS suspends it immediately and permanently deletes its resources after the post-closure period; the account cannot be reopened.
  • CreateAccount never-probe Creates a real, billable AWS account inside the organization. An AWS account can be closed but never deleted, and it counts against the organization's account quota for good.
  • CreateGovCloudAccount never-probe Creates a linked AWS GovCloud (US) account together with its commercial account; both are real, billable and permanent.
  • CreateOrganization never-probe Makes the calling account the management account of a new organization. An account can belong to only one organization, so this either fails or permanently changes the caller's own account.
  • DeclineHandshake never-probe Declines an invitation permanently: AWS moves the handshake to DECLINED, and it can no longer be accepted.
  • DeleteOrganization never-probe Deletes the organization itself, along with every policy, organizational unit and setting in it. There is no undo.
  • DeleteResourcePolicy never-probe Deletes the organization's delegation resource policy, which may be the only grant giving delegated administrators their access; the document is not recoverable.
  • DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator never-probe Immediately withdraws an account's delegated administrator role for a service, and with it that account's access to the service's organization-wide data.
  • DetachPolicy never-probe Detaching a policy takes effect immediately and can remove the guardrail every account under the target relies on.
  • DisableAWSServiceAccess never-probe Disables trusted access for a service across the organization. AWS documents that the service loses access to organization data, and that re-enabling it does not restore what the service removed on the way out.
  • DisablePolicyType never-probe Disabling a policy type in a root detaches every policy of that type from every target beneath it.
  • EnableAWSServiceAccess never-probe Grants a service organization-wide access and lets it create service-linked roles in member accounts.
  • EnableAllFeatures never-probe Migrates the organization from consolidated billing to all features. AWS documents the change as one that cannot be reversed.
  • EnablePolicyType never-probe Enables a policy type in a root, changing what every account beneath it may do; the paired disable then detaches every policy of that type.
  • InviteAccountToOrganization never-probe Sends a real invitation to another AWS account, which its owner sees and has to act on. Nothing about the call can safely miss.
  • InviteOrganizationToTransferResponsibility never-probe Starts a transfer of management responsibility to another organization — an ownership and billing change the recipient can accept.
  • LeaveOrganization never-probe Removes the calling account from its organization. AWS requires the account to be able to operate standalone afterwards, and rejoining needs a fresh invitation.
  • MoveAccount never-probe Moves an account between roots or organizational units, which immediately changes the policies that apply to everything in it.
  • PutResourcePolicy never-probe Replaces the organization's delegation resource policy wholesale; the document it overwrites is not recoverable.
  • RegisterDelegatedAdministrator never-probe Grants an account delegated administrator rights over a service for the entire organization.
  • RemoveAccountFromOrganization never-probe Removes a member account from the organization. The account must be able to operate standalone, and rejoining needs a fresh invitation.
  • TerminateResponsibilityTransfer never-probe Terminates an in-flight responsibility transfer; the transfer cannot be resumed afterwards.
  • UpdateResponsibilityTransfer never-probe Mutates an in-flight responsibility transfer — a billing-ownership change already under way.

Secrets Manager

  • RemoveRegionsFromReplication never-probe Deletes a secret's replicas in other Regions. AWS deletes a replica immediately — there is no recovery window for one — so the secret value stops being readable in that Region the moment the call lands, and nothing in a probe group puts it back.
  • ReplicateSecretToRegions never-probe Creates a copy of the secret in other Regions. Each replica is a separate billed secret that outlives the run, and ForceOverwriteReplicaSecret will overwrite a secret somebody already keeps under that name in the destination Region.
  • RestoreSecret probe-of-implemented-op RestoreSecret is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • RotateSecret probe-of-implemented-op RotateSecret is implemented (Supported), so it may not be probed, and no recipe resource gives it a role
  • StopReplicationToReplica never-probe Promotes a replica to a standalone secret and breaks its link to the primary. The split is not reversible — the two secrets diverge from that call onwards — and it is run against the replica, which is somebody's live secret.

SNS

  • AddPermission never-probe Adds a statement to a live topic's access policy, granting the named AWS accounts the named actions on it. Nothing in a probe group removes what it adds, and the result is another account holding rights over the caller's topic.
  • CreatePlatformApplication never-probe Registers push credentials (an APNs certificate, an FCM server key) as a platform application in the caller's account. The credentials are stored, the application is billable to use, and nothing here deletes it.
  • CreatePlatformEndpoint never-probe Registers a device token against a platform application, which is what makes a device a push target. A probe would enrol a device nobody asked to enrol.
  • CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber never-probe Starts SMS-sandbox verification for a phone number, which sends a one-time password by SMS to whoever holds it. A probe would text a stranger.
  • DeleteEndpoint never-probe Removes a platform endpoint, so the device behind it stops receiving push notifications. AWS documents the call as idempotent, which means it reports nothing when it has destroyed something.
  • DeletePlatformApplication never-probe Deletes a platform application and every endpoint under it, so every device registered against it stops receiving notifications at once.
  • DeleteSMSSandboxPhoneNumber never-probe Removes a verified destination number from the account's SMS sandbox, which stops the account being able to text it until somebody re-verifies it.
  • OptInPhoneNumber never-probe Opts a phone number back in to receiving SMS from the account after its holder opted out. Opting somebody back in is the one SMS action whose whole purpose is to override a person's stated preference, and AWS allows it only once every 30 days.
  • PutDataProtectionPolicy never-probe Replaces a live topic's data protection policy wholesale, so the redaction and blocking rules an owner relies on to keep PII out of a topic are gone the moment the call lands.
  • RemovePermission never-probe Removes a statement from a live topic's access policy by label, so whichever account that statement was for loses its access immediately.
  • SetEndpointAttributes never-probe Writes attributes onto a live platform endpoint — Enabled among them, which is what decides whether a device is sent anything at all.
  • SetPlatformApplicationAttributes never-probe Writes attributes onto a live platform application, including the push credentials themselves and the event-notification topics AWS reports delivery failures to.
  • SetSMSAttributes never-probe Sets the account-wide SMS preferences: the monthly spend limit, the default sender id, the delivery-status role. These are one set per account, so a probe would overwrite the caller's own settings and could not put them back.
  • VerifySMSSandboxPhoneNumber never-probe Completes SMS-sandbox verification with a one-time password. It is a write against the account's sandbox, and a probe guessing a password is the shape of a brute-force attempt rather than of a read.

SQS

  • AddPermission never-probe AddPermission is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • CancelMessageMoveTask never-probe CancelMessageMoveTask is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free
  • RemovePermission never-probe RemovePermission is not a read operation; probes call unimplemented operations against a live account and must be side-effect free